Fintech platform in Bucharest
The payment service accepts calls only from two cryptographically identified services, so no other compromised component can reach it, even inside the same network.
Zero Trust implementation in Romania usually stops at employees and laptops. We apply it where it is often missing: between services. An internal certificate authority, short-lived certificates rotated automatically, a separate identity for every service and mandatory mTLS mean that one compromised container cannot open the rest of your network.
The classic model assumes that anything inside the internal network is trusted. Zero Trust removes the assumption: every call is authenticated and authorised, wherever it comes from. In practice, each service receives its own certificate, presents it on every connection and checks the certificate of the other side. Without a valid certificate the call does not pass, even if an attacker already runs code on another server in the same private network.
Zero Trust is not bought from a vendor, it is built in steps that can be verified one at a time. We apply the list below gradually, starting with the services that touch personal data, and we leave it in your documentation together with the order we followed. Every step is reversible, so you do not end up with a network that is secure on paper but in which nobody can debug a rejected call.
A service mesh such as Linkerd or Istio gives you mTLS and policy without changing the application, but it adds components to operate and resource use on every pod. For around ten services a mesh is usually too much: we reach the same result with cert-manager or step-ca and TLS settings in the application or the proxy. We tell you honestly where the line is, based on the number of services and the team that runs them.
For Romanian companies in scope of NIS2, transposed through Emergency Ordinance 155/2024, access control between systems is a concrete requirement, not an architectural preference. Non-compliance is penalised administratively and corrective measures are mandatory. The work comes out of your monthly hours, 1–8 h on VPS and 5–10 h on dedicated servers depending on the plan, requested in the client panel under DevOps Services. Anything above the quota is billed separately.
Every plan includes monthly hours of DevOps, CyberSecurity and Programming work delivered by the 4hosting team: 1 h from cPanel Advanced upwards, 1–8 h on VPS, 5–10 h on dedicated servers depending on the plan, and 10 h on GPU servers. You request them from the client panel, unused hours are not carried into the next month, and extra hours are accepted and billed separately.
Tell us which services you run, which ones touch sensitive data and how they talk to each other now, then propose a deadline.
We map the calls, choose between a mesh and cert-manager, set the order of the services and estimate the hours from your allowance.
We start the internal authority, issue certificates, enable mTLS in permissive mode, check the traffic, then switch each service to mandatory.
You receive the identity map, the authorisation policies, the rotation procedure and the debugging steps for a rejected call.
The payment service accepts calls only from two cryptographically identified services, so no other compromised component can reach it, even inside the same network.
An application exchanging data between institutions uses short-lived certificates and a complete log of calls, useful for debugging and for audits alike.
The component that reads patient data is isolated by explicit policy: only the appointments interface can call it, with its own identity and over an encrypted channel.
Linkerd is simpler, uses fewer resources and covers the usual need for mTLS and basic policy. Istio offers more routing and control, at a matching operating cost. For a small number of services, both are probably more than you need.
No. With cert-manager or step-ca plus TLS configured in the application or a proxy, you get mutual authentication without sidecars. A mesh pays off when you have many services and teams and want mTLS applied uniformly without touching each application.
With ordinary TLS only the server proves its identity, with the certificate you see in a browser. With mTLS both sides do: the client presents a certificate too. A service cannot then be called by an unknown component, even one that has network access.
In reversible steps. We start the internal authority, issue certificates, enable mTLS in permissive mode, which also accepts plain traffic while we check what connects, then move to mandatory one service at a time. Every stage has a way back.
With cert-manager or step-ca, which issue short-lived certificates and renew them before expiry, with no manual work. Services reload them from a volume or from memory. We test rotation at delivery, so you do not discover problems on the expiry day.
A VPN protects traffic from the internet, but inside it there is still implicit trust: any compromised process can call any service. mTLS adds identity to every call. The two complement each other, and together they make lateral movement much harder.
We set up an internal authority, short-lived certificates and mTLS between services, in reversible steps, using your included hours.